What Drives Individual Participation in Mass Protests? Grievance Politicization, Recruitment Networks and Street Demonstrations in Romania by Tatar, Marius Ioan
www.ssoar.info
What Drives Individual Participation in Mass
Protests? Grievance Politicization, Recruitment
Networks and Street Demonstrations in Romania
Tatar, Marius Ioan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Tatar, M. I. (2020). What Drives Individual Participation in Mass Protests? Grievance Politicization, Recruitment
Networks and Street Demonstrations in Romania. Journal of Identity and Migration Studies, 14(2), 112-140. https://
nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-70802-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-SA Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-SA Licence
(Attribution-ShareAlike). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0
                      
Journal of Identity and Migration Studies 
Volume 14, number 2, 2020 
112  
 
 
 
What Drives Individual Participation in Mass Protests? Grievance 
Politicization, Recruitment Networks and Street Demonstrations in 
Romania 
 
Marius Ioan TĂTAR 
  
 
 
Abstract. Participation in street demonstrations has become a key form of political action 
used by citizens to make their voice heard in the political process. Since mass protests can 
disrupt political agendas and bring about substantial policy change, it is important to 
understand who the protesters are, what motivates them to participate and how are they 
(de)mobilized. This article develops a two-stage model for examining patterns of protest 
mobilization in Romania. Using multivariate analysis of survey data, this article shows that 
grievances, biographical availability, social networks, and political engagement variables have 
different weight in explaining willingness to demonstrate on the one hand, and actual 
participation in street protests, on the other hand. The findings suggest that protest potential 
is primarily driven by selective processes of grievance politicization, while recruitment 
networks and organizational ties seem to play a key role in moving people from willingness 
to demonstrate to actual protest participation. 
 
Keywords: protest, participation, demonstration, mobilization, politicization, grievances, 
recruitment, Romania 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An increasing number of studies view protest participation as a key element 
of a wider repertoire of political actions through which citizens can voice their 
discontent within the political process (Kostelka and Rovny 2019; Grasso and Giugni 
2016; Aytaç and Stokes 2019). Protest behavior can take many forms ranging from 
signing petitions, attending strikes or street demonstrations, boycotting, occupying 
buildings and other public spaces, or joining in more violent political activities. 
However, participation in street demonstrations is often viewed as the “prototypical 
protest activity of citizens today”, at least in Western societies (Stekelenburg, 
Klandermans, and Walgrave 2018, p. 371). According to Stekelenburg et al (2018), 
since the onset of the 2008-2009 economic crisis, not only did contention spike to 
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the level of the 1960s, but also anti‐government demonstrations have become by far 
the most employed repertoire of contention, used by citizens to demand political 
changes and express indignation. Thus, the prominence of anti-government 
demonstrations mainly emerged in a period marked by harsh economic conditions. 
In this context, people attributed much of the responsibility for the economic crisis 
and the inability to manage it to political corruption that was essentially perceived 
as a corruption of democracy (della Porta, 2015). Eastern Europe has also 
experienced significant economic contraction during the crisis (Bartlett & 
Monastiriotis, 2010; Connolly, 2012) and this in turn has altered the patterns of 
political activism in the region (Cisar & Navratil, 2015). While the post-communist 
transitions of these countries have been characterized by relative quiescence 
(Vanhuysse, 2006), protests during and after the economic crisis of 2008-2009 seem 
to contradict previous patterns of political apathy, since dashed expectations about 
improving living standards came with increased political discontent (Breissinger & 
Sasse, 2014).  
This article analyzes Romania as a case that thoroughly illustrates these 
regional patterns: after a relatively long period of political apathy, a revival of citizen 
activism was recorded during the economic crisis. Massive demonstrations erupted 
in January 2012 in most major Romanian cities triggered by the introduction of new 
healthcare reform legislation. In February 2012, protests have eventually led to the 
resignation of the center-right government that has adopted harsh austerity 
measures in 2010. The 2012 protests were particularly important since they appear 
to have had a ‘demonstration-effect’ for a series of noteworthy episodes of 
contention, recurrently erupting in Romania in recent years. Thus, a new taste for 
protest actions seems to have emerged in Romania after the 2012 demonstrations 
(Tătar, 2015b). Since then, people became increasingly eager to challenge political 
elites on various grounds, ranging from governmental inefficiency and corruption to 
environmental issues (Ana, 2017;  Mărgărit, 2016; Vesalon & Crețan, 2015). Because 
recent episodes of contention had notable impact in repeatedly curbing certain 
public policies, influencing election results and dismissing governments (Tătar, 
2015b), it is important to know who the protesters are and how do they mobilize for 
collective action. 
Thus, the article focuses on understanding individuals’ mobilization to mass 
demonstrations in Romania. The underlying assumption is that protest mobilization 
is as a multi-stage process (Shultziner and Goldberg, 2019) that in this article entails 
                      
Marius Ioan TĂTAR 
JIMS – Volume 14, number 2, 2020 
 
114 
 
two steps: first, transforming grievances into willingness or readiness to protest and 
second, converting willingness to demonstrate into actual participation in 
demonstrations. Various categories of factors such as relative deprivation, 
biographical availability, social networks and motivational attitudes are expected to 
play different roles at each mass mobilization stage. Using survey data collected in 
Romania in 2012 as part of the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-2014), 
the study develops a typology of demonstrators/non-demonstrators that sorts 
people into four mutually exclusive categories, based on their position in the protest 
mobilization processes: non-demonstrators (those who said they would never 
demonstrate); potential demonstrators (those willing to demonstrate but who have 
not attended street protests yet); previous demonstrators (participants in street 
demonstrations before 2012, but who have not joined the 2012 demonstrations); 
participants in the 2012 demonstrations (those who were active in the 2012 protests, 
but who might have also attended demonstrations in the past). Comparing the 
features of these four categories, will pinpoint the role of various categories of 
factors at each stage of the protest mobilization process. 
The rest of this article is structured into 6 parts. The first part contextualizes 
protest participation trends in Romania. The second part provides a literature review 
on individual level determinants of protest participation. The third section discusses 
research design, methods and data used in statistical analyses. The next section 
employs multinomial logistic regression to contrast the profile of these four types of 
demonstrators/non-demonstrators. To trace the drivers of protest mobilization, I 
first compare the characteristics of non-demonstrators with the features of potential 
demonstrators. Then, I contrast the profile of potential and actual demonstrators. 
The last two sections discuss the main findings and the contributions to the broader 
academic literature on political participation and social movements.    
 
Trends of protest politics in Romania 
 
In general, Romania typifies regional patterns of the relative political apathy 
of post-communist citizens from Eastern Europe (Tătar, 2019). Economic hardships 
during the transition period, low living standards, increased uncertainties and risks 
of everyday life came along with mistrust in the new democratic institutions and the 
political class in general (Tătar, 2016). In this context, widespread estrangement 
from politics and public sphere and a general decline of both electoral and protest 
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participation define citizen participation in post-communist Romania. This trend can 
be illustrated by the availability of Romanians to protest and their actual 
participation in protest actions, which both have substantially decreased during 
1998-2008 (see Figures 1 and 2). 
At the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the majority of Romanians were 
less involved in politics ( for instance, turnout in the 2008 parliamentary elections 
was only 39.2%). Thus, the upsurge of citizen activism during the Great Recession 
emerged after a relatively long period of political apathy. This shifting trend is 
revealed by the significant rise of protest potential measured here by the availability 
to protest during the economic crisis (see figure 1): willingness to demonstrate 
increased from 23% in 2008 to almost 40% in 2012, readiness to strike rose from 5% 
to 29%, while the proportion of potential petitioners increased from 21% to 29%. It 
is noteworthy that the share of Romanians willing to protest in 2012 has reached 
similar levels to those documented at the end of the 1990s when the country also 
went through a difficult economic crisis. Moreover, levels of satisfaction with life and 
personal income, as well as the magnitude of social pessimism recorded during the recent 
crisis also resemble those registered at the end of the first post-communist decade 
(Mărginean et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Protest Potential in Romania (1998-2018)
 
Data source: Author’s own elaboration based on EVS, 1999, 2008, 2018; WVS 1998, 2005, 
2012, 2017/2018. Data represent % of those who declared they ‘might do’ each of these forms 
of political action. 
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The significant increase of protest potential on virtually all forms of political 
action (see Figure 1) seems to result from growing popular discontent with 
socioeconomic and political developments in Romania, during the economic crisis. 
With a GDP per capita of only 45% of the EU average, Romania ranks second last in 
the EU in terms of economic development. According to Eurostat data, the GDP of 
Romania contracted in 2009 by 6.3% and continued to decline by 1.7% in 2010, a 
year in which the Romanian government adopted harsh austerity measures: public 
sector wages were cut by 25%, VAT increased from 19% to 24%, the payment of 
overtime hours in the public sector was eliminated as well as other employment 
benefits, several subsidies were reduced and some social protection benefits were 
cut. Austerity in spending impinged on various public services such as education, 
welfare and healthcare and thus affected large segments of the population. People 
from various social standings felt increasingly insecure and vulnerable. 
However, as Stoica and Mihăilescu (2012) suggest these macroeconomic 
determinants are not enough to generate and explain public perceptions and 
reactions to austerity policies adopted in Romania during the economic crisis. Other 
factors including political instability and poor functioning of institutions are equally 
important. All along the post-communist transition, as well as during the economic 
crisis, the vast majority of Romanians negatively assessed the way the country was 
governed (Mărginean, et al., 2010). While institutional trust has been traditionally 
low in post-communist Romania, further decline of confidence in key institutions of 
representative democracy came along after the adoption of austerity measures in 
May 2010. At that time, only 10% of Romanians trusted their national parliament 
and only 12% their national government, compared to a European average of 31% 
and 29% respectively (European Commission, 2012).  
These developments place the Romanian case into broader transnational 
patterns suggesting that the austerity measures adopted during the economic crisis 
have exacerbated previously existing trends of mistrust in representative institutions 
of democracy. As highlighted by della Porta (2015), the economic crisis has fuelled a 
legitimacy crisis which took the form of a crisis of political responsibility. She points 
out how neoliberal policies of liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation reduce 
state capacity to respond to citizens’ expectations, while the growing role of 
international organisations has substantially limited the sovereignty of states. 
Political responsiveness to citizens’ demands and needs has been further hindered 
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by an increased collusion between politicians and business. The effect was a growing 
mistrust in representative institutions shared not only by protest movement 
activists, but also by the citizenry at large (della Porta, 2015). Despite different 
background conditions, della Porta (2015) notes similarities in recent protest 
episodes in various countries and links them to shifts in neoliberal capitalism and its 
effects on society. Thus, in many places protesters have criticised the functioning of 
representative democracy for serving only the interests of the elites, a perceived 
‘1%’ who held political and economic power, contrasted with the wide majority of 
citizens, the ‘99%’.          
 
Figure 2:  Protest Participation in Romania (1998-2018)  
 
Data source: Author’s own elaboration based on EVS, 1999, 2008, 2018; WVS 1998, 2005, 
2012, 2017/2018. Data represent % of those who declared they ‘have done’ each of these forms 
of political action. 
 
Various precipitating events tipped the balance in favor of mass protests 
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after the President of Romania advocated this new healthcare bill during a live TV 
talk-show. After weeks of street demonstrations, protests have eventually led in 
February 2012 to the resignation of the center-right government that has adopted 
the austerity measures in 2010. Other protests started in the spring of 2012 against 
shale gas drilling projects, while the summer of 2012 has witnessed further street 
demonstrations, making 2012 one of the richest years in protest events in the last 
decades. 
The reservoir of potential protest significantly increased during the 
economic crisis in Romania and so did the share of actual protesters. For instance, 
both attending street demonstrations and joining in strikes recorded substantial 
growth between 2008 and 2012 (see Figure 2). Overall, the percentage of Romanians 
who have participated in at least one of the five protest activities presented in figure 
2 has increased from 14.7% in 2008 to almost 19% in 20121. However, comparing 
data in figures 1 and 2 reveals a more spectacular increase in protest potential than 
actual protest participation. This suggests that among those willing to protest only 
some proportion ended up participating in collective action. As noted by 
Klandermans (2004), protest mobilization is usually a lengthy multi-stage process. 
With each step smaller or larger numbers of potential protestors drop out for various 
reasons. Borrowing the ‘demand and supply’ metaphor from economics, 
Klandermans (2004, pp. 360-369) claims that successful mobilization gradually brings 
‘demand’ that is the protest potential in a society together with ‘supply’ that refers 
to the opportunities to protest staged by protest organizers and mobilization 
networks. Following Klandermans (2004), as well as Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) we 
view protest mobilization as a multi-stage process and analytically disentangled it 
into protest potential and actual participation in protests. Comparing the 
determinants of protest potential and participation might provide useful insights 
into what were the individual level drivers of the 2012 protest mobilizations. 
 
Who demonstrates? Theorizing individual determinants of protest participation 
 
The question as to why people engage in political protests has generated a 
lot of interest among scholars coming from various disciplines such as political 
science, sociology, political economy, social psychology, and history. Depending on 
 
1 The difference between the proportions of protesters in 2012 and 2008 is statistically 
significant according to a Z test: Z-score is 3.1658, significant at p <0.01. 
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their academic background, various researchers stress the importance of some 
explanatory factors over others. While the methods of inquiry and terminology 
greatly vary among different branches of social sciences (Schussman & Soule, 2005), 
individual or micro-level explanations of protest behaviour fall into four broad 
categories: grievance theory, resource theory and biographical availability, 
mobilisation networks and organisational ties, and cultural-motivational theories. 
 
Relative deprivation and grievances 
 
Classical theorists of contestation politics argue that people engage in 
protests to express their grievances coming from relative deprivation, frustration, 
moral indignation or perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind & Tyler, 
1988). Grievances have different sources. First, relative deprivation and social justice 
theories emphasize perceptions of illegitimate inequality as the main factors leading 
to grievances. Second, what might explain the explosive onset of some protests are 
suddenly imposed grievances that refer to an unexpected threat or inroad upon 
people’s rights or circumstances (Walsh, 1981 cited in Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 
2013). Suddenly imposed grievances are particularly strong predictors of protest 
participation when people perceive certain political decisions as directly threatening 
their life or social position. Third, when people perceive that important values or 
principles are violated, grievances are expressed in the form of moral outrage 
(Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Moreover, social psychologists claim that 
people care more about how they are treated than about the fairness of outcomes 
(Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013) that is, procedural justice might be a more 
influential predictor of protest participation than distributive justice (Tyler & Smith, 
1998). 
The economic crisis of 2008-09 as well as the accompanying austerity and 
deterioration of public services had widespread detrimental effects on individuals’ 
life (della Porta, 2015). Given the suddenness with which grievances were imposed 
it is expected that factors related to perceptions of economic and social deprivation 
should play a key role in explaining protest engagement (Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014). 
Scholars often point to a new class, ‘the precariat’, including young, unemployed or 
only part-time employed and often well-educated persons, that emerged as the 
main actor of anti-austerity protests (della Porta, 2015, p. 17). We use several 
indicators to capture the relative deprivation felt by individuals during the economic 
crisis, particularly in connection with rising unemployment, pessimism about future 
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developments and declining purchasing power. Therefore, one could hypothesize 
that persons dissatisfied with their household financial situation and those who are 
in a precarious position being worried about losing their job or not finding a job are 
more prone to protest in times of crisis. In line with procedural justice theories, 
injustice and abuses of power are expected to strengthen the influence of grievances 
in explaining protest during the economic crisis. Therefore, we expect that persons 
who perceive that the government violates their rights by wiretapping or reading 
personal mail or email will be more likely to attend street demonstrations. 
 
Biographical availability and strategic resources 
 
While the conclusion of relative deprivation theories is that at the heart of 
every protest are grievances (Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013), not all aggrieved 
people protest. Only when additional factors come into play do grievances result into 
actual protest (Rucht, 2007). Research of political engagement often focuses on 
individuals’ resources that may facilitate political action (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 
1995). Education is viewed as one of the strongest resource predictors of both 
conventional and protest participation because it provides cognitive and civic 
awareness which help citizens better understand politics (Norris, 2002). The main 
thesis of the resource model is that people with higher economic status - higher 
education, higher incomes, and better occupational positions - are more active in 
politics. Some resource variables, such as age, gender, education, marital and 
employment statuses and caring for children, have been grouped under the label of 
‘biographical availability’ for protest involvement (Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014, p. 495). 
Since certain forms of protest behaviour such as attending street demonstrations 
involve some physical activity risks as well as time availability, it is expected that men, 
respectively younger people that lack obligations linked to family or occupation to be 
more prone to participate. As more demonstrations are commonly organised in large 
cities it is likely that individuals’ place of residence influences their propensity to 
protest, even after controlling for the effect of other factors.  
 
Political engagement and motivations 
 
By disentangling protest participation into a two-stage mobilisation process, 
Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) demonstrate that biographical availability affects 
individuals’ willingness to protest but it does not turn protest potential into actual 
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protest involvement. Therefore, in addition to civic skills and biographical resources 
other factors, such as motivation, are also necessary for individuals to become active 
in protest politics.  For instance, some individuals might have an instrumental 
motivation to protest in order to promote or defend their interests by achieving 
some collective goals (general incentives) or individual benefits (selective 
incentives). On the other hand, those who mainly want to affirm their political views 
may protest based on expressive or ideological considerations (Klandermans, 2004). 
In times of austerity it is expected that people having leftist orientations to be more 
active in protests (Peterson et al., 2015). In terms of motivational determinants of 
protest involvement, it is relevant to distinguish, as Ruding and Karyotis (2014, p. 
488) have emphasized, whether protests during the economic crisis are reflective of 
‘new’ or ‘old’ politics. More specifically, are these protests a continuation of new 
social movements expressing post-materialist values and concerns for issues such as 
the environment or peace, or do they represent a return to old materialist 
movements, which have been mobilised by traditional organisations such as trade 
unions or political parties? Beside post-materialist orientations, other prominent 
attitudes and values mentioned in the political behaviour literature (Quintelier & van 
Deth, 2014; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Smith, 2009) as being associated with political 
actions include: political interest, support for democracy as a system of government, 
as well as trust in the political institutions of representative democracy. The 
availability of leftist parties in parliament can also stimulate cognitive mobilisation, 
since protesters can find allies to support their issues (Tarrow, 2012), in the context 
of anti-austerity demonstrations.  
 
Mobilisation networks and organisational ties 
 
On the other hand, since most protest events are not spontaneous and 
solitary acts, but organised collective actions (Fillieule, 1997), protest involvement 
also requires mobilisation opportunities. Therefore, both the propensity to protest 
and the repertoire of protest actions is highly contingent on a person’s belonging to 
various social networks and organisations that create the availability of collective 
action opportunities. Furthermore, as Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) argue, 
individual grievances and feelings of frustration are transformed into group-based 
grievances and emotions within social networks. Moreover, the effect of 
embeddedness into social networks on the propensity to participate in politics 
depends on the amount of political discussion that occurs in these networks and the 
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information people are able to gather about politics (McClurg, 2003). In addition, 
individuals’ centrality position in online social networks is associated with a higher 
propensity to engage in political discussions (Miller, Bobkowski, Maliniak, & Rapoport, 
2015). In the case of younger age cohorts online and offline political activism 
significantly correlate (Hirzalla & Zoonen, 2011). In brief, social networks function as 
communication channels in which discursive processes take place to form consensus 
that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson, 1992; 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Thus, social networks can contribute to the 
mobilisation of colleagues, neighbours, friends, or relatives in the political process. On 
the other hand, organisational approaches emphasize the mobilising role of political 
parties, unions, and voluntary associations in activating political engagement, creating 
protest opportunities and asking people to participate (Schussman & Soule, 2005). 
Previous involvement in protests might socialize people into specific forms of collective 
action increasing their chances to engage in such behaviour in the future (Rüdig & 
Karyotis, 2014). 
 
Research design, data and methods 
 
The empirical analysis in this article is based on survey data collected in 
Romania in 2012 as part of the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2015). 
WVS was chosen because it comprised a wide range of indicators of both protest 
behaviour and its potential predictors. Moreover, WVS data are comparable over time 
offering the opportunity to illustrate trends of political action before, during, and after 
the economic crisis. Without focusing on a specific protest movement, the goal of this 
article is to distinguish between the characteristics of various types of demonstrators 
and non-demonstrators in order to understand who protested and who did not in the 
context of harsh economic conditions in Romania.  
The Romanian WVS 2012 dataset comprises 1503 respondents and is 
representative for the Romanian adult population. The questionnaire included five 
items on protest actions: signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful 
demonstrations, joining in strikes and any other act of protest. The interviewers asked 
respondents whether they ‘have done’, ‘might do’ or ‘would never do’ any of these 
political actions (WVS, 2015). For those who said they ‘have done’ the given activity, a 
second question was asked about how often they have done it in the last year: ‘not at 
all, once, twice, three times, more than three times’ (WVS, 2015). Since fieldwork was 
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carried out at the end of 2012, this second question broadly covers protest activities 
done in 2012, a year marked by the revival of mass demonstrations in Romania, after 
a decade of relative political apathy. Although street demonstrations were not the only 
form of political protests, they were allegedly the prominent type of protest actions in 
2012. For this reason, the analysis focuses on demonstrators which emerged as the 
most visible and increasing segment of protesters (Fillieule & Tartakowsky, 2013) 
particularly during the economic crisis (della Porta, 2015). Thus, one may reasonably 
expect that any new patterns of protest politics that might have developed in times of 
crisis should be noticeable first of all in this group of protesters. Nevertheless, as shown 
in Figures 1 and 2, not only actual participation in demonstrations has increased in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis, but also the pool of potential demonstrators. 
Therefore, we should also pay attention to the factors that influence individuals’ 
willingness to demonstrate. 
In order to trace the drivers of mass demonstrations during the economic crisis 
we adapt Beyerlein and Hipp’s (2006) approach and treat protest mobilisations as a 
two stage process: willingness to attend protest demonstrations and conversion of 
willingness into actual participation in demonstrations. Using a differential approach 
to protest mobilisation allows for comparisons between non-demonstrators (i.e. those 
who said they would never demonstrate), potential demonstrators (i.e. those willing 
to demonstrate, but have not done it yet) and actual demonstrators (i.e. those who 
have demonstrated). Moreover, since the WVS questionnaire also asks about 
participation in more recent demonstrations in the last year (that is 2012) one can 
further break the category of actual protesters into previous demonstrators (those 
who attended demonstrations in the past, but were inactive in 2012) and the 2012 
demonstrators (those who might have attended demonstrations in the past, but were 
also active in the 2012 demonstrations). By comparing the socio-political profile of the 
previous protesters and the 2012 protesters we particularly seek to understand the 
determinants of participation in the massive demonstrations that erupted in Romania 
during the economic crisis and the routes to protest mobilisation in this period. Thus I 
constructed a typology of protestors which serves as the dependent variable in the 
following multinomial logistic regression analyses and has four mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive categories: 1. Non-demonstrators – this is the reference 
category to which all the other categories will be contrasted and it comprises 49.8% of 
the adult population in Romania; 2. Potential demonstrators 40.8%; 3. Previous 
demonstrators 3.4%; 4. 2012 demonstrators 6%. 
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What factors best predict individuals’ belonging to a certain category of 
demonstrators? To answer this question, I examine the socio-political profile of the 
types of demonstrators by multivariate analysis. Multinomial logistic regression is a 
statistical technique suitable for this purpose as it highlights the characteristics that 
best distinguish the four types of demonstrators/non-demonstrators. The analysis 
included a complex statistical model with 25 predictors (independent variables) that 
can be broadly divided into four categories: relative deprivation, biographical 
availability/resources, mobilisation networks, political engagement and ideology 
(see Appendix for the measurement of variables included in analysis and descriptive 
statistics). Correlations between independent variables were weak, not posing 
multicolinearity issues. 
A sequential multinomial logistic regression was performed through SPSS 
NOMREG to assess predictions in one of the four categories of the dependent 
variable (i.e. non-demonstrators, potential demonstrators, previous demonstrators, 
and 2012 demonstrators). The reference category is the non-demonstrators. I 
entered the 25 predictors in the analysis in three stages. First relative deprivation 
and biographical availability variables were included resulting in the partial model 1 
(see model 1 in Table 1) which has produced a significant differentiation among the 
four groups of demonstrators/non-demonstrators [χ2 (4245, N=1431) = 2660.68, p = 
1, deviance criterion], the variance explained by the model being R2 (Nagelkerke) = 
0.145. After the addition of 9 mobilisation network predictors (see model 2 in Table 
1) the explained variance of the dependent variable increased to and R2 (Nagelkerke) 
= 0.253 [χ2 (4206, N=1431) = 2511.74, p = 1, deviance criterion]. The final model (see 
model 3 in Table 1) also included the political engagement and ideology predictors 
and further significantly improved the differentiation between the four types of 
demonstrators/non-demonstrators R2 (Nagelkerke) = 0.340 [χ2 (4182, N=1431) = 
2366.16, p = 1, deviance criterion]. The full model (3) correctly classified 63.7% of all 
cases. The non-demonstrators were correctly identified in 77.1% of cases; the 
potential demonstrators were identified correctly in 58.6% of cases, the previous 
demonstrators in 6.5% of cases, and the 2012 demonstrators in 22.5% of cases. There 
was a tendency to incorrectly classify cases of the least numerous categories, to the 
largest categories (i.e. the non-demonstrators and potential demonstrators).   
The 25 predictors have unequal individual effects on explaining the variance 
of the dependent variable. According to their impact on improving the prediction of 
belonging to one of the four types of demonstrators (details not shown here) the 
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best performing predictors were: political interest, previous participation in 
environmental demonstrations, place of residence, age, education, vote intention 
for USL (anti-austerity coalition), sex (male), membership in voluntary associations 
and political parties. 
 
Findings: Who participated in the 2012 street demonstrations and who did not? 
 
Table 1 shows Exp (B) coefficients (odds ratios) of multinomial logistic 
regression models and statistical significance (in bold). The reference category of the 
dependent variable is non-demonstrators. Data presented in table 1 allow for an 
assessment of the differences between the relative effects of predictors belonging 
to various theoretical models. These differences will be discussed below, first as 
comparisons between each type of potential and actual demonstrators and the non-
demonstrators and then by pointing out differences between potential 
demonstrators, previous demonstrators and 2012 demonstrators, according to the 
25 predictor-variables (see Appendix). 
 
The potential demonstrators compared with the non-demonstrators 
 
Two grievance indicators differentiate people expressing willingness to 
protest from those who said they would never demonstrate (see Model 1 in Table 
1). Thus, potential demonstrators are more likely than non-demonstrators to be 
worried about losing their job or not finding a job in the future. They are also more 
worried about government wiretapping or reading their personal mail or email, than 
non-demonstrators. In terms of resources and biographical availability, potential 
demonstrators are more likely to live in bigger urban settlements and tend to have 
lower household incomes but higher educational levels than non-demonstrators. 
These features imply that persons with a relatively precarious position on the job 
market might have higher levels of protest potential. On the other hand, pensioners 
tend to express lower levels of availability to join street demonstrations compared 
to employed persons. In terms of organizational ties, potential protesters tend to 
report membership in political parties, more often than non-demonstrators. They 
are also more cognitively engaged in politics, expressing higher interest in politics 
and a clear voting preference for a coalition of political parties (USL) that opposed 
the austerity measures adopted in Romania. Compared, with non-demonstrators, the 
potential demonstrators seem to hold more often post-materialist values measured 
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here by a preference for ‘giving people more say in government and protecting freedom 
of speech’ over ‘maintaining order and fighting rising prices’ (WWS, 2015). Overall, the 
features that seem to significantly differentiate potential demonstrators from non-
demonstrators are the following: grievances related to their relatively precarious 
position on the job market, higher levels of education, ties to political parties, higher 
rates of interest in politics, anti-austerity voting preferences and post-materialist values. 
However, apart from ties to political parties the potential protesters do not seem notably 
well embedded into personal, employment or civil society related social networks. 
 
The previous demonstrators compared with the non-demonstrators    
 
None of our relative deprivation indicators significantly differentiates previous 
protesters from non-demonstrators. The two categories of respondents also tend have 
similar levels of household incomes. Thus, the lack of grievances might be one of the 
explanations for the previous demonstrators’ non-involvement in the 2012 
demonstrations. In terms of biographical availability, previous demonstrators seem 
more likely to come from the above 50 years old age cohort and to report not having 
children. They also tend to have higher levels of education and to reside in bigger cities, 
compared to non-demonstrators. However, they seem to be disengaged from most of 
the organisational and personal ties that could have mobilised them to participate in the 
2012 demonstrations. On the other hand, they tend to have higher levels of interest in 
politics and display post-materialist values. In terms of voting preferences, they were not 
supporters of the anti-austerity coalition (USL) as the potential and the 2012 
demonstrators were. In general, the profile of previous demonstrators seems to fit quite 
well the features describing participants in ‘new social movements’: mainly urban, 
middle-class, highly educated persons having post-materialist orientations. 
 
The 2012 demonstrators compared with the non-demonstrators  
 
Compared with the non-demonstrators, the 2012 demonstrators tend to have 
lower household income. They are also more likely to be male, coming more from the 
above 50 years old age cohorts, than from the younger generations. Residence is an 
important predictor that differentiates demonstrators from non-demonstrators 
showing that the 2012 protestors were mainly persons living in bigger cities. 
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Table 1: Multinomial Analysis of the Types of Demonstrators/Non-Demonstrators in Romania during the Economic Crisis 
Dependent variable - Types of 
demonstrators: 1. Non-demonstrators 
(reference category) 2. Potential 
demonstrators 3. Previous 
demonstrators 4. 2012 demonstrators 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Potential 
demonstrators 
Previous 
demonstrators 
2012 
Demonstrators 
Potential 
demonstrators 
Previous 
demonstrators 
2012 
Demonstrators 
Potential 
demonstrators 
Previous 
demonstrators 
2012 
Demonstrators 
Predictors included in the model compared with Non-demonstrators compared with Non-demonstrators compared with Non-demonstrators 
Relative deprivation/Grievances 
  Financial dissatisfaction 0.919 0.680 0.811 0.954 0.653  0.847 0.971 0.689 0.937  
  Worried about losing job or not finding a   
   job 
1.387* 1.678 1.204 1.177 1.577 1.003 1.120 1.553 0.918 
  Worried about government wiretapping  
  or reading personal mail/email 
1.394** 
 
1.661 1.708* 1.359* 1.616 1.645 1.255  1.472 1.438 
Biographical availability/Resources 
  Household income 0.935* 1.009 0.988 0.921* 0.992 0.884 0.925*  1.019 0.861* 
  Male 1.317* 2.377** 3.082*** 1.293* 2.217*  2.692*** 1.089 1.791 2.213** 
  Age 18-29 vs. 50+ 1.074 0.228* 0.177*** 0.692 0.126** 0.037*** 0.828 0.153* 0.045*** 
  Age 30-49 vs. 50+ 1.120 0.438* 0.617 0.807 0.394* 0.308** 0.855 0.385* 0.352** 
  Education (higher) 1.196*** 1.354** 1.325*** 1.142** 1.391** 1.105 1.115* 1.378** 1.083 
  Residence (bigger cities) 1.105*** 1.150* 1.223*** 1.108*** 1.168*  1.252*** 1.119*** 1.163* 1.282*** 
  Married or living with partner vs. single 0.868 1.741 0.565 0.982 2.317 0.638 0.892 2.058 0.473 
  Divorced, separated or widowed vs. single 0.531* 1.696 0.613 0.657 2.462 0.845 0.587 2.108 0.614 
  Children 1.063 0.413* 0.694 0.990 0.368* 0.467 1.014 0.394* 0.508 
Mobilisation Networks 
  Part-time or self-employed vs. full-time  
  Employee 
  1.034 1.438  1.950 0.979 1.382 1.781 
  Retired vs. full-time employee 0.609* 1.276 0.688 0.535** 1.170 0.548 
  Housewife vs. full-time employee 1.202 2.449 0.750 1.128  2.257 0.720 
  Student vs. full-time employee 1.268 3.606 2.375 1.131 2.705 2.146 
  Unemployed vs. full-time employee 1.482 2.034 0.598 1.323 1.964 0.408 
  Public sector 1.401* 0.741 1.203 1.315 0.634 1.036 
  Member of trade union 1.356 1.307 1.448 1.411 1.345 1.768 
  Member of political party 2.446** 3.855** 4.177** 1.802* 2.425 2.994* 
  Member of voluntary association 1.052 1.072 2.334** 1.060 0.963 2.301** 
  Supervisor (at work) 0.936 1.259 1.900* 0.912 1.110 1.799* 
  Talks with friends and colleagues to  
  obtain information   
1.066 1.263 1.417** 1.025 1.256 1.347* 
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Dependent variable - Types of 
demonstrators: 1. Non-demonstrators 
(reference category) 2. Potential 
demonstrators 3. Previous 
demonstrators 4. 2012 demonstrators 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Potential 
demonstrators 
Previous 
demonstrators 
2012 
Demonstrators 
Potential 
demonstrators 
Previous 
demonstrators 
2012 
Demonstrators 
Potential 
demonstrators 
Previous 
demonstrators 
2012 
Demonstrators 
Predictors included in the model compared with Non-demonstrators compared with Non-demonstrators compared with Non-demonstrators 
  Uses PC frequently 1.162 0.976 1.574* 1.161 0.939 1.648* 
  Previous participation in environmental  
  demonstrations 
1.749*  3.232* 7.146*** 1.571 2.561* 7.060*** 
Political engagement and ideology 
  Political interest   1.720*** 2.267*** 1.899*** 
  Vote for USL (anti-austerity coalition) 1.443* 0.964 2.150** 
  Democratic support 1.067 0.944 1.135 
  Trust political institutions 1.013 0.912 1.088 
  Left-Right Scale: Left vs. Centre   1.270  1.995 1.309 
  Left-Right Scale: Right vs. Centre 1.293 1.451 2.750** 
  Materialist vs. Post-materialists 0.537* 0.197** 0.743 
  Mixed-materialists vs. Post-materialists  0.576* 0.319* 0.617 
      
-2 Log Likelihood 2660.685 2511.747 2366.168 
Nagelkerke R2 0.154 0.253 0.340 
 N=1431 N=1431 N=1431 
Data source: author’s own elaboration based on WVS 2012. 
Note: Data represent Exp (B) coefficients (odds ratios) of multinomial logistic regression models: values higher than 1 represent a positive effect, values below 1 represent a 
negative effect of a predictor variable on the dependent variable, controlling for the effect of all other variables included in the statistical model. Statistically significant coefficients 
in bold: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. For nominal or ordinal predictors, the reference category’s parameter is set to 0, because it is redundant. Example of reading data: men, 
compared to women, are over 3 times more likely (3.082) to have attended a demonstration in 2012, given the other variables in the model are held constant (see Model 1, column 
3 for the 2012 demonstrators). 
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Marital status and having children do not seem to be linked with 
participation in the 2012 demonstrations. Part-time employees, students and the 
unemployed were not significantly more likely to demonstrate than full-time 
employees. Although directly affected by the 25% wage cuts and the reduction of 
employment benefits, public sector employees were not significantly more likely to 
attend demonstrations than private sector employees once we control for the effect 
of other variables. Trade union membership is not significantly associated with 
mobilization in these demonstrations. 
On the other hand, embeddedness in various social and political networks 
seems to drive individuals to demonstrate. Thus, compared to non-demonstrators, 
the 2012 demonstrators are more likely to be members of political parties and civil 
society organisations, to supervise other people at work, having thus a leadership 
role in their network of contacts, to more frequently talk with their friends and 
colleagues to obtain information, to use personal computers frequently1 and also 
use the internet, mobile phones and email daily to gather information about what is 
going on in their country and the world. Besides mobilisation networks that provide 
engagement opportunities and requests for participation, previous involvement in 
demonstrations for some environmental cause is also a strong predictor for 
attending demonstrations in 2012. 
In terms of political engagement variables, participation in the 2012 
demonstrators is positively associated with higher levels of interest in politics and 
vote intention for the anti-austerity coalition USL, which eventually won both the 
local and parliamentary elections of 2012. In terms of ideological orientations, the 
2012 Romanian demonstrations might be different from the anti-austerity 
movements that were animated by leftist ideas in countries such as Spain, Portugal 
or Greece. Overall, our results point out that the 2012 Romanian demonstrators 
seem to be more on right side of the ideological spectrum, although street 
demonstrations were also joined by groups having leftist orientations (Stoica, 2012). 
While, both potential and previous demonstrators tend to hold post-materialist 
values, the 2012 demonstrators are not significantly different from non-
 
1 The variable ‘frequency of using PC’ very highly correlates (Pearson r=0.784) with an 
additive index composed of variables measuring the frequency of using new information and 
communication technologies ICT (i.e. internet, mobile phones and email) to obtaining 
information. To avoid multicollinearity issues, only the variable ‘frequency of using PC’ was 
included in the logistic regression models although similar results have been obtains in 
separate analyses conducted with the ICT index (not shown here).  
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demonstrators in terms of post-materialist orientations. These findings point out the 
hybrid character of the 2012 demonstrations in terms ideological and value 
orientations. 
 
Discussion: Protest mobilization in times of crisis 
 
In order to understand how people mobilised to demonstrate in the context 
of dire economic condition we view protest as a two-stage process in which first, 
economic grievances are politicised and turned into willingness to protest and 
second, willingness to protest is converted into actual protest mainly inside 
mobilising networks that provide both opportunities and requests for participation. 
Following and adapting Schussman and Soule’s (2005) and Beyerlein, K. & Hipp’s 
(2006) approaches, protest mobilisation is viewed as a multi-stage process in which 
certain factors predict willingness to protest while others predict actual protesting.     
 
From discontent to protest potential: politicisation of grievances 
 
In the context of widespread economic hardships, one might expect 
grievance variables to play a key role in explaining protest involvement. However, as 
noted by social movement scholars, grievances do not lead automatically to protest. 
Instead, they require the framing of responsibility by mechanisms of politicisation 
(della Porta, 2014). In times of crisis and austerity, first citizens must feel the 
deterioration of macroeconomic and social conditions on their everyday life. Then 
through a process of politicisation they place much of the responsibility for the 
economic crisis and the inability to deal with it on the political leaders and 
institutions. Thus, the politicisation of grievances spreads political mistrust and 
creates a crisis of legitimacy which in turn fuels a motivational crisis manifested 
thorough the willingness to act. The target of action is singled out in the government 
and the regime and then mobilisation resources must be available to start protesting 
(della Porta 2014).  
Overall, the individual level indicators of grievances and perceived injustice 
seem to perform better in explaining protest potential than actual protest 
involvement, illustrating thus the initial stage of protest mobilisation. In addition, 
once we control for the influence of political engagement and ideology variables, 
direct effects of grievances on protest potential become insignificant being thus 
mediated by political and motivational factors. This suggests that there is indeed a 
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political route in transforming economic grievances into willingness to protest and 
the key intervening factor seems to be the politicisation of grievances through a 
process of blame attribution targeting politicians and political institutions. Our 
findings show that individuals who are more interested in politics, those who are 
members of political parties and have a clear voting preference for opposition parties 
might be more willing to use demonstrations to express their grievances. This finding 
might be explained by the fact that politically engaged persons are more likely to be 
exposed to politicised protest discourse framed by social movements, opposition 
parties or the media which target collective action on the government and the 
regime. On the other hand, aggrieved people that are not exposed to politicisation 
framing and thus lack cognitive mobilisation seem more likely to become politically 
cynical and apathetic, as political disaffection theories would predict (Torcal & 
Montero, 2006). In addition to politicisation of grievances, biographical availability 
related to gender and age, as well as resources such as higher educational levels, or 
even more importantly, higher mobilisation opportunities derived from living in 
larger cities, all influence people’s willingness to protest but also their actual 
engagement in protests.  
 
From protest potential to actual protesting: recruitment networks 
 
This analysis has shown some similarities but also some differences in the 
factors that predict protest potential and actual participation. The similarities relate 
mainly to biographical availability and political engagement variables while the 
differences pinpoint to recruitment networks. These differences might explain why 
some persons only expressed their willingness to protest while others have joined in the 
2012 street demonstrations. An essential feature that sets apart the 2012 demonstrators 
is their embeddedness in various mobilisation networks. Civil society organisations, 
political parties and as well as politicised social networks of friends and colleagues in 
which political discussions take place frequently were important drivers of protest 
mobilisation in the 2012 demonstrations. The centrality of individuals in their social 
network also mattered, since those holding leadership positions at work were more 
prone to demonstrate. Along with these factors, the frequency of using personal 
computers and online means of communication and information (e.g. internet, email, 
mobile phones) is also positively associated with participation in the 2012 protests 
(Burean & Bădescu, 2014). Overall, potential demonstrators have comparable high levels 
of interest in politics as the 2012 demonstrators, but they seem to be disconnected from 
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the politicised networks that provided the mobilisation context leading to participation 
in the 2012 demonstrations. 
Growing popular discontent during the economic crisis created mobilisation 
opportunities for various social actors, such as civil society organisations (CSOs) which 
engaged people in protests targeting broader issues (political corruption, environmental 
protection, urban planning, etc.). Even if the economic downturn could have imposed 
constraints in the funding resources of many of these organisations and networks, 
overall, membership in CSOs grew after 2008. As data from the WVS/EVS surveys point 
out, in Romania the share of respondents who reported membership in at least one CSO 
rose from 19% in 2008 to almost 30% in 2012. The share of political party joiners has also 
increased in the same period from 3.6% to 7.5%. These developments suggest an 
increased politicisation of certain segments of the population during the crisis, since civil 
society members and party joiners discuss political matters with friends more frequently 
and tend to consider politics as being more relevant to their life, than non-members 
(Tătar, 2015a). 
The findings also suggest a persistent participation gap between men and 
women in terms of protest mobilisation. The effect of gender on protest mobilisation is 
to a certain degree mediated by political and ideological variables. But even after we 
control for the influence of these factors, men are over 2 times more likely to have 
participated in the 2012 demonstrations compared to women. Presumably, women are 
more prone to view participation in street demonstrations as a high risk activity. On the 
other hand, research on political participation in Romania has shown that women are as 
likely as men to participate in less contentious forms of protest such as petitioning (Tătar, 
2011). Age is also a strong biographical predictor for attending demonstrations in 2012 
but its effect goes in the contrary direction than expected. Demonstrators are more likely 
to be above 50, than in the 18-29 or 30-49 age cohorts. This finding may be linked with 
the fact that the massive demonstrations of early 2012 have been triggered by the 
government’s intention to commodify healthcare public services that are particularly 
needed by the elderly. 
 
Beyond ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements: the hybrid character of the 2012 
demonstrations 
 
Our analysis has pointed out significant differences between previous 
protestors and the 2012 demonstrators. The previous demonstrators tend to have 
higher levels of income and education and are more likely to report post-materialist 
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value orientations. Plausible reasons for the non-involvement of the previous 
demonstrators in the 2012 protests seem to be their lack of support for the opposition 
parties (USL) on the one hand, and their disconnection from the recruitment networks 
that provided the mobilisation context for protest in 2012. Nevertheless, several 
mobilisation network variables did not play the anticipated role in predicting protest 
participation in the context of harsh economic conditions. For instance, membership in 
trade unions is not related to potential or actual involvement in demonstrations. 
Typically, unions specialize in strikes not in demonstrations as their main protest tactics. 
Moreover, in Romania participation in strikes is normally confined to full-time employed 
members of public sector trade unions (Tătar, 2015a). As our findings show, none of 
these categories were particularly active in the 2012 mobilisations, although public 
sector employees were directly affected by the 25% cutbacks in wages adopted along 
with the austerity package in 2010. Other potentially discontented categories, such as 
the unemployed or the students (Apăteanu and Tătar, 2017; Tătar and Apăteanu, 2019), 
were also not significantly more involved in these demonstrations than the general 
population. These findings further raise questions about the nature of the 2012 protest 
movements. 
How do the Romanian 2012 demonstrations fit in the recent wave of European 
anti-austerity protest? Research suggests that the profile of protests in Romania has 
shifted in the last decades from old to new politics (Burean & Bădescu, 2014). During the 
communist period and in the 1990s, old materialist issues connected with worker strikes 
for higher wages and better jobs dominated the protest agenda. However, following a 
much earlier West European trend, the 2000s were marked in Romania by the 
emergence of new social movements of middle class, young, urban and highly educated 
citizens that mobilise through social networks for issues that are linked to the quality of 
democracy and life (Burean & Bădescu, 2014). In our sample, the group of previous 
demonstrators seem to conform to patterns of new social movements as they tend to 
display post-materialist values, have higher levels of education and middle household 
income. On the other hand, the 2012 demonstrators seem to be a mixture of old 
materialist politics and new post-materialist movements. Essentially, the 2012 
demonstrations have had a hybrid nature, gathering a wide diversity of people. Some of 
them were having environmental concerns and high levels of computer literacy and 
intensively use online communication networks to obtain information. Yet others came 
from the lower income strata, from the older age cohorts and had average levels of 
education. Instead of singling out the re-emergence of old class conflicts, the lack of 
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significance of our employment and occupational status variables suggests that austerity 
measures led to the precarisation of broad parts of the population. Thus, none of the 
traditional categories (unemployed versus employed, public versus private sectors) 
stands out as particularly more mobilised to protest during the crisis. As della Porta 
(2015) notes, anti-austerity mobilisation that bridges together people from various 
precarious positions implies broad cross-generational and cross-class coalitions. The 
2012 Romanian protests seem to illustrate this pattern. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2012 demonstrations were the first significant mass protests in a series of 
major episodes of contention that recurrently emerged in Romania, in the aftermath 
of the economic crisis. Both the media and politicians often depicted the 2012 protests 
as spontaneous riots of the desperate and the marginalized. However, the findings 
presented in this article reveal a  different picture. Demonstrators seem well 
embedded in existing social networks and civil society organisations. They frequently 
discuss political matters with friends or colleagues and often hold a leadership position 
in their network of contacts. They are neither the ‘strangers at the gates’ of 
institutional politics, as Tarrow (2012) suggests. On the contrary, many of these 
protesters have organisational ties with political parties and show a clear voting 
preference for anti-austerity parties. Overall, protesters seemed to be recruited from 
the socially active and politically engaged parts of the Romanian society. 
To understand mobilisation in times of crisis we have used public opinion data 
to construct a typology of protestors. This allowed multiple comparisons, not only 
between those who demonstrate and those who do not, but also among potential and 
actual demonstrators, as well as between the 2012 demonstrators and previous 
demonstrators. Contrasting the profile of various types of people who stand at 
different stages of protest mobilisation enabled a sequential approach to analysing the 
recruitment process for the street demonstrations in 2012. Thus, protest mobilisation 
was viewed as a two-stage process that first entails turning discontent into willingness 
to attend demonstrations and then, converting willingness into actual protest. Various 
categories of factors such as grievances, resources, social networks, and cultural-
motivational attitudes play different roles in predicting protest mobilisation at each 
stage. In the first stage, protest potential seems to be primarily driven by the 
interaction of a set of factors pertaining mainly to grievance and cultural-motivational 
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theories. Our findings suggest that economic grievances are transformed into 
willingness to protest through a process of politicisation in which much of the blame 
for the crisis and the inability to deal with it is placed on politicians and political 
institutions. However, politicisation processes are selective. Persons who are 
cognitively engaged in politics (in our data those who are more interested in politics, 
who are seeking political information and discuss politics frequently) are more likely to 
be exposed to politicised protest discourse. Social movements, opposition parties or 
the media produce and re-produce such protest frames that target protest action on 
the government or the regime. In the second stage of the mobilisation process, 
recruitment networks and organisational ties appear to play a key role in transforming 
willingness to demonstrate into actual protest. Comparing the profiles of potential 
protestors and the 2012 demonstrators reveals that civil society organisations, political 
parties and politicised online and offline social networks of friends and colleagues were 
important drivers of protest participation in the 2012 demonstrations. 
Essentially, the early 2012 protests had a hybrid nature that transcends the 
dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements. The wide diversity of people 
attending these protests suggests, as della Porta (2015) has observed in several other 
European anti-austerity movements, broad cross-generational and cross-class 
coalitions and solidarities. The mixed nature of the 2012 protestors was also facilitated 
by the relatively open and inclusive character of these demonstrations. During 
January-February 2012 people gathered daily for several weeks on the University 
Square in Bucharest and also on the main squares of other major cities of Romania. 
Public squares have become, in that period, open spaces in which anyone could have 
joined demonstrations to voice their discontent. Without having a clearly identifiable 
organisational core, the January-February 2012 protest demonstrations have been 
joined by diverse groups of people ranging from simply discontented individuals to 
NGO activists, nationalists, anti-capitalists, groups of the new right, ultras, 
monarchists, environmentalists and feminists (Stoiciu, 2013; Ana, 2017). What has 
united these diverse groups was the perceived source of popular discontent: ruling 
politicians and generally the corruption of the political class (Stoica, 2012). In this 
sense, the Romanian demonstrations of 2012 seem to fit more general patterns of 
anti-austerity protests spreading in the cities of the world in search for ‘another 
democracy’ that creates multiple public spaces in which citizens can make their voice 
heard (della Porta, 2012, p. 274). 
More generally, protest demonstrations aim to impact the social and political 
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environment. But they also have individual effects on demonstrators themselves. 
Although the 2012 demonstrations have been doubtlessly also joined by ‘newcomers’ 
to protest politics, persons who had previous experience in protest participation (for 
environmental causes in our dataset) were 7 times more likely to attend the 2012 
demonstrations, compared with individuals without prior protest experience. This 
finding suggests that previous involvement in protest movements might create an 
activist identity by socializing people into specific forms of collective action. 
Subsequently, the acquired repertoires of contention can be used by social movement 
activists in various contexts, and for totally different causes. Moreover, if 
demonstrations are successful in curbing policies and dismissing governments, this 
further encourages the use of protest as a strategic resource. This might clarify why, 
even if the economic crisis and austerity policies ended, protest episodes occur 
repeatedly and even intensify, as actually happened in Romania since 2012. 
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Appendix. The Measures 
  
The empirical analysis in this article is based on survey data collected in Romania in 
2012 as part of the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) 2010-2014. The 
WVS 2012 dataset comprises 1503 respondents and is representative for the 
Romanian adult population. 
Variable/Index Name Measures and descriptive statistics 
Dependent Variable 
Types of demonstrators 1.Non-demonstrators (reference category) = 49.8%; 
2.Potential demonstrators=40.8%; 3.Previous 
demonstrators=3.4%; 4. The 2012 demonstrators=6%. 
Independent Variables 
Grievance/relative deprivation indicators 
Dissatisfaction with  household 
financial situation   
Yes=27.1% (tend to be completely dissatisfied) 
No=72.9% 
Worried about losing job or not 
finding a job 
Yes= 49.6% 
No=50.4% 
Worried about government    
wire-tapping or reading my 
personal mail/email 
Yes=44.9% 
No=55.1% 
Biographical availability/Resource 
  Household income (scale) Mean=4.836, SD=2.130, Min=1, Max=10 
  Male Yes=48.1%; No=51.9% 
  Age ‘18-29’=21.2%; ‘30-49’=37.1%; ‘50+’=41.7% 
  Education (scale of highest level 
attained) 
Mean=6.296; SD=1.880; Min=1; Max=9 
  Residence (scale of size of 
locality) 
Mean=4.449; SD=2.240; Min=1; Max=8 
  Marital status 1.‘Married or living with partner’=66%; 2.‘Divorced, 
separated or widowed’=16.4%, 3.‘Single’=17.6% (ref. 
cat.). 
Having children Yes=72%, No=28% 
Mobilisation Networks 
Employment status 1.‘Part time or self-employed’=7.9%; 
2.‘Retired/pensioned’=29.8%;  
3.‘Housewife not otherwise employed’=15.8%; 
4.‘Student’=5.3%;  
5.‘Unemployed’=5.8%; 6.‘Full-time employee=35.4% 
(reference category). 
Public sector employee Yes=27.8%; No=72.2% 
Member of trade union Yes=8.3%; No=91.7% 
Member of political party Yes=7.5%; No=92.5% 
Member of voluntary association Yes=29.7%; No=70.3% 
Supervisor (at work) Yes=23.8%; No=76.2% 
Talks with friends and colleagues 
to obtain information (scale) 
Mean=4.081; SD=1.344; Min=1 (Never); Max=5 
(Daily) 
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Variable/Index Name Measures and descriptive statistics 
Uses PC frequently (scale) Mean=1.875; SD=0.909; Min=0; Max=3 
Previous participation in 
environmental protests 
Yes=9.2%; No=90.8% 
Political engagement and ideology 
Political interest (scale) Mean=2.146; SD=0.957; Min=1; Max=4 
Vote intention for USL (anti-
austerity coalition) 
Yes=27.1%; No=72.9% 
Democratic support (additive 
index) 
Mean=5.984; SD=1.862; Min=0; Max=12 
Trust in national political 
institutions (parliament, 
government, political parties) 
Mean=5.206; SD=2.146; Min=3; Max=12 
Left-Right self-identification 
(recoded) 
‘Left’=14.1%, ‘Right’=19.1%, ‘Centre’=66.8% 
(reference) 
Post-materialism index ‘Materialists’=29.9%; ‘Mixed’=61.9%; ‘Post-
materialists’=8.2% (reference) 
 
 
